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The economic functioning of online drug markets using data scraped from online platforms is studied. 
Analysis of over 1.5 million online drugs sales shows online drugs markets tend to function without 
the significant moral hazard problems that, a priori, one might think would plague them. Only a small 
proportion of online drugs deals receive bad ratings from buyers, and online markets suffer less from 
problems of adulteration and low quality that are a common feature of street sales of illegal drugs. 
Furthermore, as with legal online markets, the market penalizes bad ratings, which subsequently lead 
to significant sales reductions and to market exit. The impact of the well-known seizure by law 
enforcement of the original Silk Road and the shutdown of Silk Road 2.0 are also studied, together 
with the exit scam of the market leader at the time, Evolution. There is no evidence that these exits 
deterred buyers or sellers from online drugs trading, as new platforms rapidly replaced those taken 
down, with the online market for drugs continuing to grow. 
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1. Introduction
Trade in illegal drugs has been moving online in recent years. This has been facilitated by 
the opening of platforms located on the Dark Web that have grown rapidly since 2011. In the 
2017 Global Drug Survey, over one in ten respondents in the online drugs part of the survey 
report having ever bought drugs online. In some countries, this has been rising fast: in the 
UK, one of the biggest online drug purchasing countries, the percentage buying drugs from 
the Dark Web in the twelve months preceding the survey date rose from 12.3 percent in 2014 
up to 25.3 percent by 2017; in the US it doubled between 2014 and 2017 to reach 13.2 
percent; in the 2017 survey in six English speaking countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, 
New Zealand, the UK and US) the percent buying drugs online was 11.9 percent.1 
The online market for drugs is an infant industry, but it is a rapidly growing one. Its 
origins as an important economic activity date back to early 2011, with Silk Road, the first 
major online anonymous drugs platform (see Christin, 2012).2  Silk Road was located on the 
Dark Web, a part of the Internet that can only be reached through anonymisation software 
(like the Tor network3  described below), utilising encryption programs and conducting 
transactions with the anonymous cryptocurrency, Bitcoin.4 The technology used on Silk 
1 The Global Drug Survey is an annual voluntary online survey of drug users. 119846 people from over 50 
countries participated in the most recent 2017 survey, 115523 having their data used in the survey reports, 
available at https://www.globaldrugsurvey.com/wp-content/themes/globaldrugsurvey/results/GDS2017_key-
findings-report_final.pdf. For a write up of findings of the 2016 survey see Barratt et al. (2016). 
2 See Bartlett (2014) for discussion of Dark Web activities more broadly, including a Chapter on Silk Road. 
Ormsby (2014) provides a fascinating and informative narrative on Silk Road. 
3 Tor stands for ‘the onion router’. Tor hidden network services were first developed by mathematicians and 
computer scientists in the early 1990s in the US Naval Research Laboratories for ensuring anonymity of US 
intelligence communication services online. The onion analogy is because Tor nodes are encrypted in a layered 
protocol as it bounces users across different relays and nodes with high levels of encryption making it almost 
impossible to trace the location of the site and its activities. 
4 For a discussion of the economics and technology of Bitcoins see Bohme et al. (2015). 
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Road represented a major advance on previous small scale attempts to sell drugs online.5 
Indeed, the technological advances and innovation first used on Silk Road have proven 
instrumental in transforming the way in which drugs are traded. 
Silk Road and the other online drugs platforms that have subsequently opened have 
received hardly any attention from economists and have only been studied to a limited extent 
by researchers from other disciplines.6 Yet they are highly relevant to the economics of crime 
and the economics of online markets.7 Unlike other black markets, detailed time series data 
covering the items on sale, together with their prices and rated transactions, is readily 
available from scraping the websites of the online platforms. This gives a unique insight into 
the functioning of these illicit markets.  
The empirical analysis implemented in this paper utilises over 1.5 million drugs 
transactions, using data scraped from several of the largest online drugs platforms between 
2013 and 2016, to present evidence on the economic functioning of online drugs markets. 
Some of the reported evidence comes from analysing these data in ways similar to other 
research on (legal) online markets, like eBay or Amazon, where a focus has been placed upon 
5 Buying and selling drugs online was not new. For example, at times there have been some drugs listings on 
regular Internet sites like Craigslist in the US and Gumtree in the UK. Just prior to Silk Road's launch, there 
were two sites (the Open Vendor Database and Farmer’s Market) whose main activity was to sell drugs online, 
but with little or no attempt to facilitate anonymity (e.g. using PayPal for transactions payment). 
6 Examples include research in computer science by Christin (2012) and Soska and Christin (2015), who, like 
us scraped Dark Web platforms to obtain data, and the papers by crime and drugs researchers like Aldridge and 
Decary-Hutu (2014), Martin (2104) or Van Hout and Bingham (2013a, 2013b). Other up to date studies feature 
in the special issue on Drug Cryptomarkets of the International Journal of Drug Policy, published in 2016. In 
economics, at the time of writing there are only a handful of unpublished draft papers including, for example, 
those by Armona (2017), Armona and Stackman (2014) and Janetos and Tilly (2017). 
7 Of course, in the economics of crime literature, the market for illicit drugs has been a significant research area. 
The orthodox demand-supply framework used by economists to model the drug market dates back to Becker 
(1968), with many contributions since, including formal economic modelling of addiction (see, for example, 
Becker and Murphy, 1988) . There is also work that tries to estimate the market size for particular drugs (a 
recent example being Parey and Rasul, 2016) and a large body of research on the questions of drug legalisation 
(see, inter alia, the review of Donohue et al., 2011). 
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whether online activity alters the way in which trust between market participants operates 
and whether it impacts on efficiency of outcomes. A particular emphasis has been placed 
upon whether online activity enhances or diminishes seller reputations so that moral hazard 
problems either improve or deteriorate in the context of online commerce (see Cabral and 
Hortacsu, 2010). 
This study considers three aspects of the economics of Dark Web drugs activity. First, 
it offers an appraisal and empirical analysis of the buyer ratings of online drug purchases that 
the platforms collect. Second, it looks at whether these ratings act to generate a reputation 
mechanism for sellers in the illegal online market setting as other authors have proposed that 
legal online markets do. Third, the dynamics of the market are analysed, as seller turnover 
and platform turnover are observed to be high in the online drugs markets. 
The key findings are as follows. Reputation mechanisms appear to work relatively 
well -- analysis of over 1.5 million online drugs transactions reveals that the online drugs 
markets function, for the most part, without the significant moral hazard problems that a 
priori one might think would plague them. First of all, there is evidence that only a small 
minority of online drugs deals receive bad ratings from buyers. Second, as with legal online 
markets, bad ratings subsequently lead to significant sales reductions and to market exit. 
Furthermore, the quality of drugs supplied seems to be relatively high, so that online markets 
do not suffer from the problems of adulteration and low quality that are known to commonly 
feature in street sales of illegal drugs. This is likely to be because the presence of feedback 
means more information is available to buyers relative to street sales. 
Finally, as the online drugs markets have appeared and rapidly grown, they have 
simultaneously become a source of media focus and attention from law enforcement. Some 
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platforms have been seized and shut down by law enforcement. Other platforms have 
undertaken exit scams and run off with the money they were holding. Thus the market has 
become characterised by platform (and seller) entry and exit. The paper therefore looks at 
what happens to the online drugs market when large platforms exit, in particular by studying 
three specific cases, the well-known seizure of the original Silk Road, the shutdown of Silk 
Road 2.0 by law enforcement agencies and the exit scam by the market leader at the time, 
Evolution. There is no evidence that these large scale exits deterred buyers or sellers from 
continuing to engage in online drug sales and purchases, with new platforms rapidly arising 
to replace those taken down. As such, the market seems to reconstitute itself rapidly and so 
continues to rapidly grow, despite the uncertainty that platform moral hazard problems 
generate for both sellers and buyers.8 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains how the data, 
which was mostly scraped from various Dark Web platforms over time, were collected and 
processed. It also shows how these data can be used to document the rise of the online drugs 
market over time.  In Section 3, findings are reported from the reputations analysis which 
studies the ratings of drugs transactions that buyers provide, how they compare with street 
‘ripoffs’. It also presents statistical evidence on the impact of bad ratings on seller sales 
performance and on seller exit. Section 4 considers what happened to the online drugs market 
after law enforcement agency shutdowns and exit scams caused the exit of market leaders. 
Finally, Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
8 See also the recent analysis for the Silk Road 2.0 shutdown under Operation Onymous that reaches the same 
conclusion by Decary-Hutu and Giommoni (2016). 
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2. Dark Web Drugs Markets
The data comes from scraping the websites of online illegal drugs markets.9 We ourselves 
have scraped data from late 2013, but also have access to some other data and information 
from before that time.  
Dark Web Drugs Platforms 
Silk Road and its successors function as two-sided markets or platforms (see Rochet 
and Tirole, 2003), serving as intermediaries for transactions between buyers and sellers. The 
drugs platforms operate on the Tor hidden network services that were first developed by 
mathematicians and computer scientists in the early 1990s in the US Naval Research 
Laboratories for ensuring anonymity of US intelligence online communication services. Tor 
bounces users across different relays and nodes, with high levels of encryption making it 
almost impossible to trace the location of the site and its activities. This feature is highly 
attractive to potential buyers and sellers, as well as the platform organizers.   
Transactions on these platforms are made using the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, so that 
payments can be made with neither buyer nor seller revealing any information about their 
offline identity. 10  The anonymity permitted by Tor and Bitcoin was the technological 
breakthrough that facilitated the emergence and rapid growth of the first big online drugs 
market, Silk Road. It distinguished itself from the small scale black markets that had been 
9 Economic research based on Big Data from scraping internet sides is relatively rare, but there are some recent 
examples beginning to emerge:  see, for example, work comparing on online and physical store (offline) prices 
using scraped online data from large retailers by Cavallo (2017). 
10 Where a physical product such as drugs is bought, the buyer has to provide a shipping address, so the 
transaction cannot be completely anonymous. Various mechanisms are used to attempt to obfuscate the buyer’s 
identity, such as using false names, or using so-called ‘drop’ addresses. 
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operating on the Dark Web before by its highly professional website and its ability to ensure 
anonymity.  
Silk Road also recommended that buyers and sellers use an escrow system, where the 
funds deposited by the buyer are withheld from the seller, and held by the platform until 
receipt of the goods is verified by the buyer. The platform owners make money from 
collecting a commission from the sales made on the website.11 In principle the escrow system 
mitigates seller moral hazard, since a seller cannot just make away with the funds without 
sending the good, a real possibility when the transaction is illegal.  However, it raises the 
problem of platform moral hazard – i.e. the platform stealing the funds held in escrow.  
Although the original Silk Road and many other platforms recommended transaction 
via escrow, it has not always been used. In some situations – particularly where sellers have 
accumulated good reputations – sales were made on a ‘finalise early’ basis, which means that 
payment is made immediately, before the goods are received. One concern that buyer and 
seller may have with the escrow system is platform moral hazard, where the platform shuts 
down and takes the money.  This can be avoided by a ‘multi signature’ escrow, whereby 
funds can be released only if two of three parties (the platform, the seller and the buyer) 
agree.  Although this would mitigate if not eliminate both types of moral hazard (seller and 
platform), it appears to have been hardly used, possibly due to the increased transaction costs 
involved. 
11 The commission on Silk Road was initially a flat rate of 6.23% of the sales price. However, as the platform’s 
lifetime progressed this was altered to a tiered schedule (rather like on eBay), with a tapered rate with higher 
commissions for lower value transactions which then reduced as the sales value rose (see Christin, 2012). 
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Figure 1 shows a screenshot of Silk Road. It looks rather like other legal E-Commerce 
sites, only the merchandise on offer is evidently different.12  The other key features are that 
the drugs on offer for sale are priced in Bitcoins and that the principal activity is to sell drugs, 
although some other (mostly) illegal items are on sale. The left hand bar shows the number 
of listings which, for the selected screenshot, shows 8859 drugs listings, which is by far and 
away the main activity on the platform. 
Christin (2012) was the first to systematically scrape large amounts of data on listings 
from the original Silk Road and he collected data from the site from February 3, 2012 to July 
24, 2012. One can find earlier information on Silk Road, with the first dating back to May 5, 
2011, from various screenshots of the site’s navigation page which features a count of the 
total number of drug listings. In what has become a highly publicised law enforcement 
intervention on cybercrime, the website was shut down by the FBI on 2 October 2013.13  
From Silk Road’s inception in January 2011, it ran for two and three quarter years. 
From the first data point from the screenshot of May 5 2011, where the site had 343 drugs 
listings, to just before the shutdown the number of drugs listing rose by a rose by a 
phenomenal nearly 3700 percent, reaching 13000 on October 1 2013 (Digital Citizen’s 
Alliance, 2014).   
Silk Road was the pioneer of online drugs trading. When shutting the platform down, 
the FBI referred to it as: “the most sophisticated and extensive criminal marketplace on the 
12 Barratt (2012) and Van Hout and Bingham (2013b) remark that “‘Silk Road’ operates similarly to ‘eBay’ ” 
and the Economist wrote on November 1 2014 about ‘The Amazons of the dark net’. Aldridge and Decary-
Hutu (2014), on the other hand, prefer to highlight the differences with legal online markets referring to Silk 
Road as ‘not an eBay for drugs’. 
13 This occurred with the well-publicised arrest of Ross Ulbricht, the 29 year old libertarian American, who 
went to trial in January 2015 and was sentenced to life imprisonment for running Silk Road in May 2015. 
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internet”.  Many more online platforms have followed as the market has continued to grow 
very rapidly. Table 1 shows the lifetimes of 88 Dark Web drugs platforms that operated 
following the Silk Road shut down by law enforcement in the time period up to the start of 
2016.14  Maybe not surprisingly there have been a lot of new setups, many of whom did not 
operate for very long as the Days Open column in the Table shows. Thus platform turnover 
is high in this online market.  But some of the bigger platforms – notably Silk Road 2, the 
direct descendent of the original Silk Road, Agora, Evolution and Nucleus – operated for 
quite some time. This is shown in Figure 2, which plots a histogram of Days Open for the 
Dark Web platforms listed in Table 1. It is evident that a large number of platforms enter and 
exit rapidly, some voluntarily and some in exit scams involving stealing the money held in 
the escrow service account most platforms operated. It is also interesting that, up to 2016, it 
is the original Silk Road that had lasted the longest, being up and running for 976 days until 
it was shut down. 
The Post Silk Road Market 
After the shutdown of the first Silk Road, it is clear that some of the sellers based 
there migrated to alternative Dark Web platforms. Two existing platforms (Sheep 
Marketplace and Black Market Reloaded), that were relatively small scale whilst Silk Road 
was in operation, straightaway experienced very rapid growth as is shown in Figure 3.15 The 
experiences of buyers and sellers on these two platforms simply could not be more different. 
The number of sales listings for drugs on Sheep Marketplace was 4358 on October 17 2013 
14 These are English language based platforms taken from Branwen (2016). 
15 There were also some smaller markets, but none took off to the extent that these two did after the demise of 
Silk Road. 
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and rose hugely to 8457 by October 30 2013. It seems the owners of the platform could not 
believe their luck and the market disappeared, along with money that was held in escrow and 
in sellers’ and buyers’ accounts on the site.16 Black Market Reloaded also shut down, but this 
time because it seemed it could not handle the increased traffic.  In a striking and almost 
inexplicable display of “honour among thieves”, the closure was announced in advance and 
the platform gave users time to withdraw their funds before it disappeared. These are two 
early examples of the transient, and short time horizon, nature of Dark Web drugs platforms 
and, in the case of Sheep Marketplace, of the issues of platform moral hazard to which we 
have already alluded. 
After this, and only 34 days after the closure of Silk Road, a new Silk Road 2.0 
platform opened up. The exponential growth of the online drugs markets resumed. We 
ourselves began to scrape weekly listings data from Silk Road 2.0 on December 8 2013, when 
there were 1450 drugs listings. By the end of the year (30 December 2013), this almost 
doubled to 2700. By January 2014 it had reached 10228. Maybe somewhat perversely, the 
international media coverage that accompanied the closure of the original Silk Road may 
have been one factor driving the rapid growth of markets at this time. 
Two highly professional platforms also entered the market soon after. These are 
Agora (in December 2013) and Evolution (in January 2014). We also collected data from 
these two platforms as they and Silk Road 2.0 became the big three players in the online 
drugs market in 2014. Figure 2 also plots their drugs listings through time.  It shows a very 
big increase in the size of the market in 2014, with massive growth initially from Silk Road 
16 Although figures are difficult to verify due to the anonymity built into the Bitcoin, various reports suggest 
the total amount stolen was in the millions or tens of millions of dollars.  
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2.0 followed by a plateauing out, and rapid trend increases for Agora and Evolution.17 By the 
start of November, there were almost 40000 drugs listings on the three markets combined, 
reflecting a huge increase in market size.  
On November 5 2014, a joint law enforcement operation (named Operation 
Onymous) carried out by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations and European law 
enforcement agencies managed to successfully shut down Silk Road 2.0. This took place 
after an FBI agent infiltrated the platform, managing to gain enough trust to be granted 
administrator rights. At the same time, some of the other smaller online markets were 
shutdown (Pandora, Cloud 9, Hydra, Blue Sky) thus causing a sizable shock to the online 
drugs market. The two biggest, Agora and Evolution, however, remained in place, both 
having a larger market share owing to the demise of Silk Road 2.0. The fact they remained 
unaffected by the law enforcement action may suggest that their platforms were 
comparatively secure, and could not be taken down by a purely technical approach.18   
In fact, after the closure of Silk Road 2.0, these two grew rapidly, although Agora’s 
operations became affected by the increased flow of buying and selling activity, sometimes 
being offline because of the increased pressures. So it was Evolution that really took off, as 
17 Silk Road 2.0 withdrew its escrow service when it was subject to a major hack on February 13 2014. There 
are varying reports, but at least 4400 bitcoins (worth $2.6 million at the time) were stolen. The site’s reputation 
may well have suffered from this, and likely contributed to the slowdown in its growth. 
18  That said, as already noted, Silk Road 2 was infiltrated by FBI agents not through any sophisticated 
technological means, but by more ‘traditional’ undercover agent activity. Indeed the head of European police 
cybercrimes division said Evolution was not part of Operation Onymous it was "because there's only so much 
we can do on one day". See http://www.dw.com/en/raids-on-underground-darknet-websites/a-18048251. 
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the trends shown Figure 3 make clear, and became the market leader.19  Evolution exited the 
market in March 2016, in an exit scam where the platform owners reputedly ran off with 
more than $12 million.20 Agora continued to grow, but finally its operating troubles took 
their toll, and it left the market in August 2016.21 Yet again, these exits resulted in very rapid 
growth of a new platform, Nucleus, which in turn became the market leader, until it too left 
the market in March 2016 in another exit scam. 
Web Scrapes  
Unlike other black markets, detailed time series data covering the items on sale, 
prices, and rated transactions, is readily available from scraping the websites of these online 
platforms. We began scraping data from the original Silk Road in August 2013, obtaining 
some full scrapes of its listings (although not actual transactions) prior to its market exit in 
October 2013. When Silk Road 2.0 opened, we began to scrape its site from December 2013. 
We also started scraping the Agora website in December 2013, Evolution in January 2014 
and Nucleus when it opened in November 2014. Thus we have data on drugs listings and 
purchases for essentially the full lifetimes of four of the largest Dark Web drugs platforms. 
This permits an empirical analysis that focuses in detail on the way in which these online 
platforms function, with data on actual drug prices and sales, for a wide range of different 
drugs, which allow a unique and large-scale insight into the functioning of illicit markets.  
19 This greater increase in market share comes in part from the fact that Evolution was more available (i.e. had 
better uptime) than Agora. Agora regularly went offline due to traffic surges, and people were worried (and 
stated so in the online forums) they were going to disappear with all the escrow funds. 
20 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/18/bitcoin-deep-web-evolution-exit-scam-12-million-
dollars 
21 Agora was taken off line and closed voluntarily with administrators claiming problems of server issues with 
security and suspicious activity. They let all customers and vendors take out all of their money first. At the time, 
they stated that had plans on improving security, after which they would return. This never materialised. 
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3. Reputations Analysis
We first study reputation mechanisms and their economic impact. This is feasible because, 
as with many legal online markets, there is a rating system where buyers rate sellers. 
The starting point is an empirical analysis that, in some respects, resembles studies of 
online legal markets. There are a number of empirical papers on eBay and Amazon, mostly 
cross-sectional in nature (see, for example, Houser and Wooders, 2006, or Resnick and 
Zeckhauser, 2002, for eBay and Mudambi and Scuff, 2010, for Amazon).  A panel data paper 
on the dynamics of seller reputation by Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) is closer in spirit to what 
we study here. They analyse a sample of very specific products sold on eBay (IBM 
Thinkpads, Collectible coins, and 1998 Holiday Teddy Beanie Babies), and find that only 
0.3 percent of sales are negatively rated, and a further 0.4 percent rated neutral. Cabral and 
Hortacsu provide evidence that, on receiving negative feedback ratings, the subsequent 
growth rate of sales declines and this also triggers a faster rate of arrival of negative 
feedbacks. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The existence of a rating system for buyers on most of the online Dark Web drugs 
markets means an analogous exercise can be conducted for the case of illegal drugs. Table 2 
shows descriptive information on the numbers of rated sales, both from Christin’s (2012) 
original Silk Road scraped data and from our own scraped data from Silk Road 2.0, Agora, 
Evolution and Nucleus.22 Summary statistics are presented separately by site and, in the final 
column of the Table, are aggregated over the five platforms. 
22 Example screenshots for Silk Road 2.0, Agora, Evolution and Nucleus are given in the Appendix. 
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The Table shows information on over 1.5 million rated sales of drugs. It also confirms 
that drug selling is the main, though not exclusive, activity on the websites. The vast majority 
of rated sales on Silk Road 2.0 (92 percent), Agora (92 percent) and Nucleus (88 percent) 
were drugs sales. The percentages in the original Silk Road (79 percent) and Evolution (73 
percent) were lower, reflecting that these platforms did sell other illicit goods, most notably 
counterfeit goods, money and documents, and other fraud-related listings. Weapons sales 
were banned on Silk Road and Silk Road 2.0 and, whilst weapons listings were present on 
Agora, Evolution and Nucleus over the period of study, rated sales were extremely 
uncommon. The smallest share of drug sales for Evolution – with a higher proportion of sales 
in fraud-related categories - is probably a result of the site’s origins, which reportedly trace 
back to an online ‘carding’ forum known as Tor Carding Forum.23   
Table 2 also breaks down the number of drugs sales (and the percent of all drugs sales 
in square parentheses) into the broad classifications the websites use, namely cannabis, 
dissociatives, ecstasy, opioids, prescription, psychedelics, stimulants and a catch-all ‘other’ 
category. All of the markets sold drugs in each of these broad categories. The Table also 
makes it quite clear that the transactions were typically relatively small, with the median 
price across markets being in the range of 36 to 45 pounds.24 That the ‘typical’ demographic 
of buyers on these markets is of consumers purchasing relatively small amounts of drugs for 
their own consumption is confirmed in the qualitative study of Silk Road consumers by Van 
Hout and Bingham (2013a). 
23 In this context ‘carding’ refers to fraudulent use of credit cards. 
24 Prices were converted to pounds using the bitcoin exchange rate prevailing on the date that the listing was 
observed. 
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Ratings Analysis 
Table 3 shows the descriptive results from the analysis of ratings. It shows the 
percentage of ratings that are positive, neutral or negative by website, and by drug 
classification. The overall impression the Table gives is very much one of positive ratings of 
product quality.  There are some negative feedbacks, but the overall percentage is small. For 
all drugs transactions on the four platforms around 1.2 to 2.9 percent of ratings are negative. 
A further 1.8 to 3.7 are neutral, meaning that between 94.5 to 96.9 percent receive positive 
ratings. So there are slightly more negative ratings than the case of eBay noted earlier. These 
relatively small percentages of unsatisfactory ratings are noteworthy when one considers that 
these are illegal transactions in market where lack of trust is likely to be widespread.   
How are good service and product quality maintained? Buyers not only rate the 
transaction, but also provide feedback comments. An investigation of the comments given 
for negative feedbacks only acts to reinforce the impression that these markets function well, 
with few deals involving products of poor quality. The majority of the negative feedback 
comments pertain to problems linked to shipping, rather than the quality of the product. One 
feature of the online drugs markets is the presence of various forums on the Dark Web where 
buyers and users of the sites have a very active discussion about what happens on these 
platforms, including frequent discussion of sellers who do not offer good deals and who 
renege on transactions (‘scammers’ is a frequently used name both in the feedback comment 
and on the forums; not surprisingly, more derogatory terms are used as well).  
Looking across drug types and platforms reveals a degree of heterogeneity. Some 
platforms seem to do better, and this is likely due to some events and the perceptions of 
security and risk on the different platforms contributing to the observed differences in ratings 
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performance. In particular, over their whole lifetimes in operation Evolution, the only site 
claiming to offer multi-signature escrow, and the original Silk Road have the fewest negative 
ratings, with respectively an overall 1.3 percent (Evolution) and 1.2 percent (Silk Road). The 
ratings of Silk Road 2.0 were initially similar to the original Silk Road, but some events 
occurred that seem to damage the platform’s reputation. In particular, the hack of the website 
that took place in February 2014 (referred to in footnote 16) seemed to damage the ratings 
and sales of the platform. 25 Finally, the highest percent of negative ratings are for Agora (at 
2.6 percent) and Nucleus (at 2.9 percent). For Agora, this seems to be because Agora has had 
periods where they faced difficulties processing financial transactions in a timely manner, 
with one particular set of problems occurring due to large trading volumes after the Silk Road 
2.0 shutdown as buyers and sellers migrated to the site. This particular event can be seen 
clearly in Figure 4 which shows the weekly drugs revenues by platform, where Agora’s sales 
revenue dips sharply in a week of late November 2014. Nucleus also seemed to face more 
volatility in the time leading up to their ultimate exit in March 2016 (see the revenue dip in 
Figure 4). 
In terms of ratings for different drug types, the numbers in the Table seem to show a 
coherent pattern, with some platform specific differences. The latter may well be tied to 
particular sellers on the sites. Overall, there seem to be fewer bad ratings of prescription drugs 
and the biggest selling drug, cannabis, also seems to be well rated across sites.  The same is 
mostly true for stimulants (the main drug here is cocaine) and psychedelics (like LSD and 
acid). The worst rated seems to be Dissociatives (which are mostly hallucinogenic drugs), 
25 For example, at the start of 2014, before they encountered some difficulties, Silk Road 2.0 ratings were better. 
In January 2014, for example, only 0.9 percent were rated negative. By July 2014, this had risen to 2.1 percent. 
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although this varies by site. Evolution seems to have easily its worst ratings here, after being 
largely the best across the other drug types. Closer inspection reveals this is dominated by 
one quite big seller with a large share of negative ratings.26 Similarly Ecstasy is well rated on 
the sites, except for Nucleus.  Thus the ratings are, for the most part, good.  Buyers are very 
active on the online forums and willing to widely share information regarding their bad 
experiences with specific vendors. Moreover, the majority of the negative ratings are 
probably not for receipt of low quality drugs, but to reflect scams or delivery problems. 
To further demonstrate this, a text analysis of the 32574 negative ratings on the four 
platforms was undertaken. An initial word search was implemented to identify text listings 
that raised issues of product quality, scams and delivery problems, and from this it proved 
possible to classify 24750, or 76 percent, of the text listings to these three broad groups. We 
then went through the remaining 7824 trying to classify them. Some of this was necessarily 
ad hoc and, at the end of the day, some could not be coherently classified, but the end result 
gave the following distribution of reasons for negative ratings: product quality = 6.6 percent; 
scams = 28.7 percent; delivery problems = 60.2 percent; not classifiable = 4.4 percent. 
Of course, this text analysis has limitations, but it is suggestive that the percentages 
of negative ratings in many cases are not so much to do with poor quality drugs, but rather 
to do with the scams and delivery problems that are a feature of the online transactions. This 
issue will be returned to shortly, when the relatively low number of negative ratings as 
compared to drug ripoffs on street markets are considered. Before moving on to that, the 
26 The one seller alone accounts for 31 percent of the 231 negative ratings for Dissociatives on Evolution. 
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results from the statistical analysis examining whether acquisition of a negative reputation 
impacts seller economic performance, and by how much, are reported.  
Reputations and Seller Performance 
Does seller reputation harm seller performance? This hypothesis is examined by 
looking at individual seller performance over time on each of the platforms, examining 
whether, and to what extent, receipt of negative ratings damages sales. This is investigated 
by putting together a panel of seller transaction histories over the lifetimes of each of the four 
platforms from which data were scraped. We put together a monthly panel of sales, where 
we can exploit the longitudinal nature of the data to look at the impact of receipt of negative 
rating on sales within sellers over time. 
Specifically, consider the following equation for sales (S) made by seller s in time 
period t (where t is month by year) on a given platform: 
logሺSstሻൌ	αs൅	γNegs,t‐1൅αt൅	vst (1)
where Negs,t-1 is the proportion of negative ratings received in the previous month, αs and αt 
are respectively seller and time (month-year) fixed effects and v is an error term. This 
empirical model includes controls for seller and time fixed effects and therefore investigates 
within-seller/drug variations that control for unobserved seller time invariant factors 
Table 4 shows the results emerging from estimating equation (1), first for all four 
platforms pooled together (in column (1)) and then separately for sellers on Silk Road 2.0, 
Agora, Evolution and Nucleus (respectively in columns (2) to (5)). Considering first the 
pooled specification in column (1), it is evident that there is a significant sales penalty 
associated with acquiring a bad reputation through negative ratings.  On average, if 10 
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percent of sales receive a bad rating in a given month, sales are about 20 percent lower in the 
following month. 
Columns (2) to (5) show this negative effect on sales effect following receipt of 
negative ratings is present, and of similar magnitude, across all four sites.  If anything, the 
penalty is slightly less negative on the platforms that were shown to have better overall 
ratings in Table 3. But overall it is a clear feature of these four sites that if a seller obtains 
higher percentages of negative ratings than the average that would lead to big reductions in 
subsequent sales. 
These panel estimates could understate the overall scale of punishment for negative 
ratings, as they are estimated for sellers continuously in the market. It is likely that 
continually bad ratings increase the probability of seller exit from the market. We consider 
this in an analysis of the exit probability of sellers that, the results of which are reported in 
Table 5. Given that all four platforms do shut down in the periods we look at, the results 
show estimates of the probability that a seller exits (before the month in which the platform 
shuts down) as a function of the previous rating history. Sellers with poor rating histories are 
significantly more likely to exit. This is the case across all the platforms that are studied. 
Thus in a way analogous to studies of legal online markets, the economic performance 
of Dark Web drugs sellers is significantly harmed by receipt of negative ratings from buyers. 
The online illegal markets function in a similar way to legal markets - consumers react to a 
decline in seller reputation by reducing purchases.   
Comparison of Ratings with Street Drug Markets 
The overall picture of drugs sales on the Dark Web sites is one of good quality and 
service, with issues of moral hazard less prevalent than one might initially surmise. Moral 
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hazard problems with drugs trades on the street are well known.  The face-to-face nature of 
these trades (usually between dealer and buyer) means that quality typically cannot be 
verified before purchase, and so it is easy to get duped into buying drugs of low or no purity. 
Moreover, relative to the anonymous online trades, there is a real possibility of violence, 
especially in the settings where street trades occur.27 
It seems natural to compare problems of product quality between the online and street 
markets. Galenianos, Pacula and Persico (2012) have calculated the percent of ripoffs from 
purchase of drugs on the street when US undercover police have actually bought drugs and 
then tested their quality, as part of the data they compile under the System to Retrieve 
Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE).28 Table 6 compares the percent of negative 
ratings for heroin and cocaine for the five online platforms with the percent of street ripoffs 
from the Galenianos, Pacula and Persico analysis. The online negative rating percent is much 
lower than the STRIDE ripoffs percent. For heroin, the negative ratings percent ranges from 
0.9 to 3.2 percent, and for cocaine from 1.4 to 3.8 percent.  The STRIDE percent ripoffs are 
8.2 percent for heroin and 7.2 percent for cocaine. Thus product quality is substantially higher 
online as compared to street transactions. This is striking; moreover, the gap between the two 
is likely understated because not all the negative ratings come about because of poor product 
quality, as many are to do with communications/delivery problems. 
27 This is backed up by numbers from the Global Drug Survey of 2015, a voluntary online survey of more than 
100,000 drug users. In the survey, 3.3 percent of online drugs buyers reported threats to personal safety as 
compared to a much higher 17.9 percent of non-online drug buyers; 1.3 percent of online buyers reported 
experiencing physical violence as compared to 7.3 percent of non-online drug buyers.  
28 Galenianos and Gavazza (2017) argue, based on the same data, that legalization would substantially reduce 
the adulteration of drugs sold on the street.  
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4. Market Dynamics
As the analysis to date has made clear, the online market for drugs is a volatile one; platform 
entry and exit has been frequent. Nonetheless, the service is of surprisingly high quality. 
Moreover, platform exits of both major players in the market and of the smaller, shorter lived 
platforms, have taken different forms. These have included the high profile shut downs by 
law enforcement, exit scams where platform owners have run off with the money being held 
by the site (in escrow and/or in buyers’ and sellers’ accounts), and voluntary exit.  In this 
section, we look at how the overall market has evolved in response to some of the major 
exits. We focus in particular on what happened to the market before and after three major 
exits, where the market leader at the time exited.  These are the law enforcement shuts downs 
of the original Silk Road and Silk Road 2.0 that occurred in October 2013 and November 
2014 respectively, and the exit scam of Evolution of March 2015. 
From an economics of crime perspective, it is interesting to study whether the 
shutdown of sites has a deterrence effect on buyers, sellers or potential new platforms that 
may enter the market. For buyers, shutdown does not result in a financial loss, unless they 
have a transaction in escrow or funds deposited in order to make a purchase. However, the 
probability of a shutdown affecting any individual transaction is so small that this is unlikely 
to have a major deterrent effect. Thus the only way in which a shutdown might affect buyers 
is by suggesting that their identities may be compromised and found by law enforcement. 
For sellers, the financial consequences of a shutdown are somewhat larger, but still very 
small. Finally, since the platform is a direct target, there is some chance that a shutdown 
might deter individuals from starting new platforms. To explore these issues, empirical 
evidence on the effects of shut downs is considered next. 
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For all three episodes, it is hard to find any evidence of deterrence;   in each case the 
overall market rebounds quickly after shutdown. Indeed, in each case, the overall market is 
at least as big or bigger three months after the market leader exit than it was before.  This 
suggests the online drugs market is responding flexibly to shocks as demand does not seem 
to be affected by the loss of the market leader. Indeed, the publicity accompanying the 
shutdowns may well have attracted new buyers to online markets, so increasing the size of 
the market. We now consider each of the three major market exits in turn. 
1). Shutdown of Silk Road 
Table 7 shows the number of drugs listings on Dark Web drugs platforms before and 
after the closure of the original Silk Road. At the time of closure, Silk Road was the major 
player in the online drugs market and had just under 9000 drugs listings. Black Market 
Reloaded, Sheep Marketplace and Deepbay were smaller platforms with a total of 5174 
listings between them, so that the overall market size in terms of listings was just over 14000. 
As was described in Section 3 and is shown in Figure 2, after Silk Road was closed, 
the market first became volatile as sellers migrated to Sheep Marketplace, Black Market 
Reloaded and Silk Road 2.0, a new site that was opened 34 days after the closure of the 
original Silk Road. But the growth of the overall market rapidly got back on trend and 
subsequently grew even faster. By January 2014 Silk Road 2.0 itself had 10228 listings and 
new online drugs platforms entered, most notably Agora and Evolution as the start of the ‘big 
three’ began, but also some small markets. By April 2014, as Table 7 shows, there were 
around 32000 drugs listings on these sites, 128 percent higher than at the time the original 
Silk Road was shut down. Thus, there is no evidence whatsoever of deterrence effects. In 
fact, it seems much more likely that the media coverage of the shutdown probably alerted 
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potential buyers and sellers, who may not have known about the existence of these online 
markets before.  Thus the shutdown of Silk Road may well have contributed to the rapid 
growth in the online drugs market. 
2). Shutdown of Silk Road 2.0 
The second significant shutdown by law enforcement was when Silk Road 2.0 was 
closed on November 5 2014. Table 8 shows the number of drugs listings and total sales 
revenue in each month of 2014 and in the first two months of 2015 for the big three platforms. 
It is evident from the Table that the rapid growth of the online drugs market continued right 
up to the Silk Road 2.0 shutdown. For example, just before that event in October 2014, there 
were over 36,000 drugs listings on all three sites and revenues reached a total of around $26 
million a month. 
The numbers in the Table also show what happened after the Silk Road 2.0 shutdown. 
There are a few things to note. The first is that Evolution grew very rapidly and became the 
clear market leader by February 2015. Its drugs listings rose from 9226 in October 2014 up 
to 14767 by December 2014, a rise of 60 percent in just two months. It continued to grow in 
2015, reaching 18554 drugs listings in February 2015. Sales revenues on Evolution rose very 
rapidly, going from $5.0 million in October 2014 to $12.8 million in February 2015, a rise 
of 156 percent.  
The second point of note is that Agora also first experienced a post-shutdown boom, 
with sales revenues rising up to $13.9 million in November and further rising to $14.3 million 
in December. But it also had some trouble coping with the influx of new demands to buy and 
sell on the website at the time, the result of which was a dip down in sales revenues in the 
first two months of 2015. 
23 
Thirdly, these patterns of change mean that the overall market size did take a hit 
following the Silk Road 2.0 closure. However, when the market reconstituted to have two 
main players rather than three, their sales performance went up compared to before the 
shutdown. Indeed, by December, sales revenues had bounced back to the pre-shutdown 
levels, at around $26 million. Therefore Operation Onymous, and its successful seizure of 
the Silk Road 2.0 site, seemed to have had an impact on the market, but only as a short-term 
transitory shock, rather than permanently reducing drug sales on the Dark Web. 
3). Exit Scam of Evolution 
When it was market leader in March 2015, with nearly 20000 listings and with weekly 
sales revenues of over $4 million, the operators of Evolution shut down the site in an exit 
scam, taking the escrow funds. Table 9 shows online drugs listings the day before the 
shutdown (on March 17 2015) and then just over a month later on April 21. There were a 
total of nearly 42000 listings on March 17, of which almost half were on Evolution 
(comprising 19902 listings).  
The highly resilient nature and rapid dynamics of the online drug markets are very 
clearly illustrated by what happened after the Evolution exit scam. First of all, there were 
already more listings only a month following the scam, at 43622 by April 21. Thus the overall 
market rebounded very rapidly and continued to grow after the scam. Second, this arose 
because of modest growth in traffic on Agora, which at the time of the scam was, by some 
distance, the second biggest online platform. Third, very rapid growth occurred at Nucleus 
and Black Bank Bitcoin, with each increasing their listings by around 5000 following the 
scam. As noted above, and shown in Figure 2, Nucleus would itself become the market leader 
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in due course. There is also the emergence of Alphabay which goes from less than 300 listings 
in March to over 2500 by April 21.29 
Summary 
Overall, it is not possible to find evidence of deterrent effects associated with either 
the two law enforcement shutdowns or the exit scam. In the case of the original Silk Road, 
the overall market grew very rapidly indeed as new players entered the online drugs trade 
and buyers and sellers quickly gravitated towards them. The publicity surrounding the 
shutdown of Silk Road seems likely to have attracted new traffic. In the case of Operation 
Onymous, and its take down of Silk Road 2.0 and some smaller sites, the big players in the 
Dark Web drugs trade (Agora and Evolution) were unable to be infiltrated and shut down by 
law enforcement. After this, they grew rapidly in terms of listings suggesting that new sellers 
were using these platforms. This was most likely driven by the pattern of migration of sellers 
that we have shown. The faster growth in sales revenue than listings also implies consumers 
switched to them after the Silk Road 2.0 shutdown, overall implying little evidence of 
deterrence effects on sellers and buyers from the law enforcement success of shutting down 
the Silk Road 2.0 platform. Finally, the market reconstituted itself rapidly after the Evolution 
exit scam, with the total number of drugs listings being higher a month later, as Agora became 
the new market leader and Nucleus grew very rapidly. 
29 After the demise of Agora and Nucleus, Alphabay became the biggest online market and, at December 2016, 
was the market leader in online drugs sales. 
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5. Conclusions
In this paper data scraped from online drug platforms on the Dark Web is studied, with an 
aim of better understanding their economic functioning and the extent to which problems of 
moral hazard impact on them. Analysis of over 1.5 million drugs sales reveals that the online 
drugs markets function, for the most part, without the significant moral hazard problems that 
a priori one might think would constrain their operation. Only a small minority of online 
drugs deals receive bad ratings from buyers and, as with legal online markets, these bad 
ratings subsequently lead to significant sales reductions. Moreover, poor product quality, and 
the likelihood of being ‘ripped off’ in purchasing drugs, seems to be less of a problem for 
drug consumers than in street purchases.  
The market also seems resilient, despite high turnover of the platforms that host the 
buyers and sellers of drugs. Indeed, following the well-known seizure of the original Silk 
Road, the shutdown of Silk Road 2.0 by law enforcement and an exit scam by Evolution (the 
market leader at the time of exit), there is little evidence that these closures – and the publicity 
surrounding them - deterred buyers or sellers from continuing to engage in the online drugs 
trade. As with legal online markets, illegal online markets are substituting for offline 
economic activity (for drugs, street transactions) as drugs buyers and sellers increasingly ply 
their trade online, a trend that seems likely to continue to increase in the future. 
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Figure 1: Silk Road Example Screenshot 
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Figure 2: Lifetimes of Online Drugs Platforms 
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Figure 3: Online Drugs Listings By Platform, 2011-2016 
 
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
N
um
be
r o
f D
ru
g 
Li
st
in
gs
5/
5/
11
6/
2/
12
23
/7
/1
2
15
/8
/1
3
1/
1/
14
1/
1/
15
1/
1/
16
5/
3/
16
Date
SR Screen SR Christin SR
BMR Sheep SR 2.0
AG EVO NU
Online Drugs Listings
Notes: SR Screen - Silk Road screenshots; SR Christin - Silk Road numbers from Christin’s 
(2012) data; SR – Silk Road from Aldridge and Decary-Hutu (2014) and Digital Citizen’s 
Alliance (2014); SR 2.0 - Silk Road 2.0, own scrapes; BMR – Black Market Reloaded, own 
scrapes; Sheep – Sheep Marketplace, own scrapes; AG - Agora, own scrapes; EVO – Evolution, 
own scrapes; NU – Nucleus, own scrapes.  
32 
Figure 4: Weekly Drugs Revenues By Platform, 2013-2016 
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Table 1: Chronology of Online Drugs Platforms 
Market Opened Closed Days 
Open 
Reason for 
Closure 
Silk Road 31 January 2011 2 October 2013 976 Shut down 
Black Market Reloaded 30 June 2011 2 December 2013 887 Hacked 
Sheep Marketplace 28 February 2013 29 November 2013 275 Scam 
Atlantis 26 March 2013 20 September 2013 179 Scam 
BuyItNow 30 April 2013 17 February 2014 294 Voluntary 
Deepbay 30 June 2013 4 November 2013 128 Scam 
Budster 10 October 2013 20 October 2013 11 Scam 
Project Black Flag 14 October 2013 28 October 2013 15 Scam 
Pandora 21 October 2013 19 August 2014 303 Scam 
Silk Road 2 6 November 2013 5 November 2014 365 Shut Down 
TorMarket 7 November 2013 22 December 2013 46 Scam 
BlackBox Market 12 November 2013 1 February 2014 82 Voluntary 
Dream Market 15 November 2013 
The Marketplace 28 November 2013 9 November 2014 347 Voluntary 
Pirate Market 29 November 2013 15 August 2014 260 Scam 
FloMarket 1 December 2013 1 January 2014 32 Hacked 
Black Services Market 2 December 2013 1 February 2014 62 Scam 
FreeBay 2 December 2013 28 February 2014 89 Voluntary 
Blue Sky 3 December 2013 5 November 2014 338 Shut Down 
Agora 3 December 2013 6 September 2015 643 Voluntary 
Tortuga 16 December 2013 5 January 2014 21 Voluntary 
TorBay 18 December 2013 20 April 2014 124 Voluntary 
White Rabbit 23 December 2013 1 February 2014 41 Scam 
Outlaw Market 29 December 2013 
GreyRoad 4 January 2014 1 February 2014 29 Voluntary 
drugslist 8 January 2014 28 February 2014 52 Scam 
Evolution 14 January 2014 14 March 2015 425 Scam 
Doge Road 18 January 2014 13 March 2014 55 Scam 
Cantina 20 January 2014 7 February 2014 19 Hacked 
TorBazaar 26 January 2014 5 November 2014 284 Shut Down 
DarkBay 30 January 2014 1 May 2014 92 Voluntary 
Breaking Bad 1 February 2014 6 February 2014 6 Voluntary 
TorEscrow 2 February 2014 19 April 2014 77 Scam 
Black Goblin Market 3 February 2014 4 February 2014 2 Hacked 
Cannabis Road 3 February 2014 7 February 2014 5 Hacked 
Utopia 3 February 2014 11 February 2014 9 Shut Down 
BlackBank Market 5 February 2014 18 May 2015 468 Scam 
Armory Vendor Market 6 February 2014 7 April 2014 61 Scam 
Cloud Nine 11 February 2014 5 November 2014 268 Shut Down 
Darknet Nation 19 February 2014 1 March 2014 11 Hacked 
Sanitarium Market 20 February 2014 28 March 2014 37 Voluntary 
Hansa 9 March 2014 20 March 2014 12 Voluntary 
Red Sun Marketplace 20 March 2014 23 March 2014 4 Hacked 
EXXTACY 23 March 2014 24 March 2014 2 Hacked 
Topix 2 25 March 2014 5 November 2014 226 Voluntary 
Hydra 27 March 2014 5 November 2014 224 Shut Down 
Cannabis Road 2 28 March 2014 25 August 2014 151 Scam 
Mr Nice Guy 29 March 2014 20 April 2014 23 Voluntary 
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Andromeda 5 April 2014 18 November 2015 228 Scam 
Silk Street 8 April 2014 4 August 2014 119 Scam 
Underground Market 9 April 2014 26 August 2014 140 Voluntary 
Pigeon Market 14 April 2014 7 May 2014 24 Voluntary 
1776 19 April 2014 2 October 2014 167 Voluntary 
Alpaca Marketplace 20 April 2014 5 November 2014 200 Scam 
Tortuga 2 23 April 2014 17 June 2014 56 Voluntary 
TOM 10 May 2014 18 December 2014 223 Scam 
Deepzone 14 May 2014 13 July 2014 61 Voluntary 
Onionshop 18 May 2014 17 September 2014 123 Hacked 
Area51 20 June 2014 24 January 2015 219 Scam 
Middle Earth Marketplace 22 June 2014 4 November 2015 501 Scam 
Freedom Market 16 September 2014 25 September 2014 10 Voluntary 
Cannabis Road 3 6 October 2014 5 November 2014 31 Scam 
Diabolus/SR3 13 October 2014 12 February 2017 854 ???? 
Nucleus Marketplace 24 October 2014 13 April 2016 538 Scam 
Panacea 27 October 2014 13 February 2015 110 Voluntary 
Abraxas 13 December 2014 5 November 2015 328 Scam 
Alphabay 22 December 2014 
Silk Road Reloaded 13 January 2015 27 February 2016 411 ???? 
Free Market 14 January 2015 26 February 2015 44 Voluntary 
Tochka 30 January 2015
Crypto Market 14 February 2015 12 February 2017 730 Scam 
Kiss 19 February 2015 16 May 2015 87 Scam 
Mr Nice Guy 2 21 February 2015 14 October 2015 236 Scam 
Ironclad 17 March 2015 25 March 2015 9 Scam 
TheRealDeal 9 April 2015 22 October 2016 563 ???? 
Havana/Absolem 13 April 2015 22 May 2015 40 Hacked 
Oxygen 16 April 2015 27 August 2015 134 Scam 
East India Company 28 April 2015 1 January 2016 249 Scam 
Haven 5 May 2015 6 June 2015 33 Scam 
Anarchia 7 May 2015 9 May 2016 369 ???? 
Zanzibar Spice 7 May 2015 14 June 2015 39 Voluntary 
Tornado 12 May 2015 20 May 2015 9 ???? 
Horizon Market 23 May 2015 8 July 2015 47 Scam 
Darknet Heroes League 27 May 2015 
Agape 29 May 2015 4 June 2015 7 Voluntary 
Poseidon 2 June 2015 29 June 2015 28 Scam 
Amazon Dark 8 June 2015 25 October 2015 140 Scam 
Simply Bear 20 June 2015 21 October 2015 124 Scam 
Notes: Amended from the Branwen (2016) dataset of English language online drugs markets, 
https://www.gwern.net/Black-market%20survival. Days open calculated inclusive of start and end date. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Numbers of Rated Sales on Dark Web Drugs Markets 
Platform Silk Road Silk Road 2.0 Agora Evolution Nucleus Total 
Time Coverage May 2011 
to July 2012 
November 2013 
to October 2014 
December 2013 
to August 2015 
January 2014  
to March 2015 
November 2014 to 
March 2016 
Total    184796  335832  597745     346961 358788  1824122 
Of which: 
Drugs   145485 [79]    309493 [92]  550627 [92]   253869 [73] 314674 [88] 1574148 [87] 
Of which: 
Cannabis 42373 [29] 79600 [26] 167193 [30] 83228 [33]  99490 [32] 471884 [30] 
Dissociatives 4082 [  3] 9024 [  3] 16520 [  3] 5393 [  2] 7838 [  2] 42857 [  3] 
Ecstasy 26656 [18] 50987 [16] 79815 [14] 34605 [14] 42109 [13] 234172 [15] 
Opioids 8472 [  6] 11214 [  4] 53015 [10] 22889 [  9] 28561 [  9] 124151 [  8] 
Prescription 11828 [  6] 47372 [15] 32846 [  6] 18029 [  7] 19462 [  6] 129537 [  8] 
Psychedelics 23937 [16] 47527 [15] 69371 [13] 25703 [10] 24438 [  8] 190976 [12] 
Stimulants 19772 [14] 57553 [19] 128686 [23] 62357 [25] 91480 [29] 359848 [23] 
Other 8365 [  6] 6216 [  2] 3181 [  1] 1665 [  1] 1296 [  0] 20723 [  1] 
Number of Drugs Sellers    902 796 2604 1754 1836 
Median Drugs Price in Bitcoins 9.22 0.13 0.22 0.18 0.20 
Median Drugs Price in GB 
Pounds 
35.53 42.43 44.54 37.48 41.30
 
 Notes: Silk Road numbers from Christin’s (2012) data. Silk Road 2.0, Agora, Evolution and Nucleus numbers from downloads of each Dark Web platform. Percent shares (rounded to the nearest full integer) shown in square parentheses. 
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Table 3: Ratings Analysis 
Silk Road Silk Road 2.0 Agora 
Number Percent of Ratings Number Percent of Ratings Number Percent of Ratings 
 Positive   Neutral  Negative Positive Neutral  Negative  Positive  Neutral  Negative 
All Drugs 145485 96.1 2.7 1.2 189628 94.8 3.3 1.9 550627 95.3 2.1 2.6 
Cannabis 42373 96.4 2.6 1.0 48882 94.0 4.0 2.0 167193 95.0 2.3 2.7 
Dissociatives 4082 96.8 2.4 0.8 5548 95.4 3.0 1.6 16520 93.8 2.5 3.7 
Ecstasy 26656 96.0 2.7 1.3 30215 95.6 2.7 1.7 79815 95.3 1.9 2.8 
Opioids 8472 96.5 2.3 1.2 7071 93.6 3.4 3.0 53015 94.9 1.8 3.3
Prescription 11828 97.0 2.0 1.0 29366 96.0 3.2 1.8 32846 96.5 1.7 1.8 
Psychedelics 23937 97.1 2.1 0.8 28435 96.6 2.2 1.2 69371 96.9 1.6 1.5 
Stimulants 19772 93.3 4.7 2.0 35939 92.8 4.9 2.3 128686 94.6 2.5 2.9 
Evolution Nucleus 
Number Positive  Neutral Negative Number Positive Neutral Negative
All Drugs 253689 96.9 1.8 1.3 314674 94.5 2.6 2.9 
Cannabis 83228 96.7 2.0 1.3 99490 94.7 2.8 2.5 
Dissociatives 5393 93.4 2.3 4.3 7838 92.8 3.5 3.7 
Ecstasy 34605 96.8 1.8 1.4 42109 93.1 2.3 4.6
Opioids 22889 98.0 1.1 0.9 28561 95.2 2.2 2.6
Prescription 18029 97.8 1.3 0.9 19462 96.6 1.2 2.2 
Psychedelics 25703 97.5 1.4 1.1 24438 95.0 2.5 2.5 
Stimulants 62537 96.8 1.9 1.3 91480 94.2 3.5 2.3 
 
 
Notes: As for Table 2. The Silk Road 2.0 numbers are different from those in Table 2 because the platform stopped the ratings system when redesigning the website in July 
2015 and did not reinstate it subsequently.
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Table 4: Monthly Sales and Negative Ratings 
Log of Monthly Sales 
All Four Platforms Silk Road 2.0 Agora Evolution Nucleus 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proportion of Sales Rated Negative [t-1] -2.011 (0.091) -1.712 (0.253) -2.207 (0.182) -1.759 (0.299) -2.014 (0.117) 
Seller Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.68 0.76 0.64 0.72 0.70
Sample Size 31393 4086 13190 5849 8268 
Number of Sellers 5094 626 1853 1259 1356
                      
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of monthly sales by seller.  Sample consists of sellers with at least three contiguous monthly observations. Standard 
errors clustered by seller in parentheses. 
38 
Table 5: Probability of Exit and Negative Ratings 
Probability of Exit Before Shutdown 
All Platforms Silk Road 2.0 Agora Evolution Nucleus 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Proportion of Sales Rated Negative [t-1] 1.658 (0.120) 6.510 (1.156) 2.397 (0.282) 1.959 (0.371) 1.214 (0.138) 
Control For Number of Months Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Platform Fixed Effects Yes No No No No 
Number of Sellers 5094 626 1853 1259 1356 
                      Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the seller exits the platform before the shutdown month.  Sample consists of sellers with at 
least three contiguous monthly observations. Probit marginal effects reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include control for number 
of months observed. 
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Table 6: Online Ratings of Heroin and Cocaine as Compared to Street Market Ripoffs 
Rated Sales From Online Drugs Markets Street Purchases 
Silk Road Silk Road 2.0 Agora Evolution Nucleus DEA STRIDE 
Dates May 2011 
to July 2012 
November 2013 
to October 2014 
December 2013 
to August 2015 
February 2014 
to March 2015 
November 
2014 to April 
2016 
1981  
to 2003 
Heroin 
Percent Negative Rated Sales/ Street Ripoffs 1.3 3.0 3.2 0.9 2.6 8.2
Number of Rated Sales/Street Purchases 6021 4579 22144 16312 19339 12721 
Cocaine 
Percent Negative Rated Sales/ Street Ripoffs 1.4 2.5 3.8 1.6 2.8 7.2
Number of Rated Sales/Street Purchases 10726 15004 44310 23009 36146 21564 
        
 
 
Notes: The numbers from STRIDE (System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence) database of drug exhibits sent to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) laboratories for 
analysis come from Galenianos, Pacula and Persico (2012). The cocaine percent of street ripoffs of 7.2 from STRIDE is a sample size weighted average of 5.3 percent ripoffs for powder 
cocaine (from 5362 street purchases) and 7.9 percent street ripoffs for crack cocaine (from 16202 street purchases). 
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Table 7: Silk Road Shutdown - Drugs Listings 
Silk Road Shutdown, 2 October 2013 
Time of Shutdown April 2014 
Total Number of Drug Listings 18174 32029 
Silk Road 13000 
Black Market Reloaded 3567 
Sheep Marketplace 1407 
Deepbay 200
Silk Road 2.0 13648 
Agora  7400
Pandora  5249
Evolution 2623
Blue Sky 1740 
6 Small Markets (<1000 Listings) 1369 
     Notes: From Digital Citizen’s Alliance (2014). 
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Table 8: Silk Road 2.0 Shutdown - Drugs Listings and Revenues 
Number of Drugs Listings Revenues (million $) 
Silk Road 2.0 Agora Evolution Total Silk Road 2.0 Agora Evolution Total 
January 2014 10228 1700 74 12002 10.8 1.1 0.1 12.0 
February 2014 13104 3200 436 16740 7.4 3.4 0.1 10.9 
March 2014 13477 6800 1917 22194 8.5 7.5 0.3 16.3 
April 2014 13672 7700 2850 24222 10.7 8.4 0.4 19.5 
May 2014 13508 9200 4658 27366 12.5 9.9 0.7 23.1 
June 2014 13505 10500 5016 29021 10.6 10.7 1.1 22.4 
July 2014 13265 11300 5828 30393 12.1 12.3 1.8 26.2 
August 2014 11961 11800 7376 31137 12.6 11.4 2.5 26.5 
September 2014 13095 12900 8312 34307 12.0 10.0 3.7 25.7 
October 2014 13796 13400 9226 36422 incomplete 12.4 5.0 incomplete 
Silk Road 2.0 Shutdown, 5 November 2014 
November 2014 13500 11864 25364 13.9 7.0 20.9 
December 2014 13300 14767 28067 14.3 11.5 25.8 
January 2015 13500 16993 30493 13.5 11.9 25.4 
February 2015 14600 18554 33154 12.2 12.8 25 
 
 
Notes: Own calculations.  See Appendix for issues calculating sales revenue numbers. The Silk Road 2.0 October 2014 numbers on 
revenues are incomplete as our last pre-shutdown scrape of the website was on 9 October 2014. 
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Table 9: Evolution Shutdown - Drugs Listings 
Evolution Exit Scam, 18 March 2015 
Time of Exit 21 April 2015 
Total Number of Drug Listings 41934 43622 
Evolution 19902
Agora 14618 16751
Nucleus 3220 8187
Middle Earth 1228 3342 
Abraxas 773 2531
Black Bank Bitcoin 601 5635 
Silkittien Dutch 407 652 
Outlaw Market 396 692 
Dream Market 337 986 
Alphabay 286 2559
Crypto Market 85 1734 
Mr Nice Guy 41 389 
Babylon 32 56
Swiss Shop 8 
The Real Deal 42 
Kiss Marketplace 36 
Tochka Free Market 30 
     
 
Notes: Own calculations supplemented with information from Digital Citizen’s 
Alliance (2015).  
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Appendix 
Revenue Calculations 
Our data contains an almost-comprehensive record of the feedback that has been left on Silk Road 
2, Agora, Evolution and Nucleus. This can be used to estimate site revenues.   
Feedback records typically contain information about the date of sale, the vendor, and the product 
sold.  These data can be linked to the weekly data that we collect on the price of listings and the 
bitcoin exchange rate. This results in a ledger of sales through time.  A basic estimate of dollar 
revenues would therefore involve conversion of prices to dollars, and summing across all items of 
feedback. 
In practice, this would be an underestimate for three main reasons.  
First, feedback is not mandatory, so there will be sales for which feedback is not recorded. Second, 
due to omissions in the data that is made available by the markets, some items of feedback cannot 
be associated with a specific product, and so their price is unknown.  Third, some purchases may 
be of multiple units of a given product, but this is not recorded in the feedback data. In our revenue 
estimates we attempt to correct for the first two of these issues, but are unable to correct for the 
third.  There are differences in methodology between the sites due to differences in the information 
that is available. 
To correct for the fact that feedback is not mandatory, a multiplier is used which represents an 
estimate of the ratio of sales to feedback.  This multiplier is calculated from statistics available on 
sellers’ pages on Evolution, which is the site with the best information to calculate a multiplier.  For 
each seller, statistics are available on the number of items of feedback received, and the number of 
sales made.  On Evolution, this multiplier can be used for each seller to multiply up sales observed 
in their feedback.  This information is not available on the other sites, but the overall average 
multiplier of 1.86 observed on Evolution has been used to multiply up revenues on Agora and Silk 
Road 2. An additional adjustment was made on a per-seller basis for sellers on Agora, because the 
site provided information on the number of rated transactions, so it was possible to identify cases 
where the scraper had not picked up every piece of feedback. 
To correct for the second issue – the missing product data in some items of feedback – we backfill 
the missing data with estimates of the likely revenue from the sale.  The estimates are generated by 
computing the average revenue per sale for each seller, using only complete records.     
Adjustments were also made for some sales where revenues appeared to be implausibly high.  There 
seems to be a practice amongst some sellers of inserting an implausibly high price on a listing when 
the item goes out of stock, as a signal to buyers that they should not buy the item. This ‘signal’ price 
is usually very high - $100000 or more. This practice is sometimes picked up in our data because 
our price data is collected weekly, and therefore cannot be exactly synced with the price that 
prevailed at the time of sale. To correct for this issue, a simple ceiling of $5000 per sale was used, 
above which it was assumed product data was missing.  This ceiling was chosen because inspection 
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of the data found that sales of $1000 to $5000 tended to be valid sales of large quantities.  Sensitivity 
testing showed that varying the $5000 ceiling made little difference to the overall revenue estimates. 
Finally, it should be noted that the statement that feedback is not mandatory is at odds with some 
other work in the area.30  This is something that has been difficult to verify given that we have not 
made any purchases, and the sites no longer exist.  However, as part of the work to create revenue 
estimates, we researched this area in some depth and all the evidence we collected and saved from 
this research pointed to feedback being non-mandatory. Specifically, we searched the forums of the 
different sites for evidence, and asked questions to the forum users. The responses to our questions 
– from multiple forum users - were that feedback was non-mandatory. We also have direct evidence
from Evolution that feedback was non mandatory in that some sellers were able to attain ‘seller 
ranks’ that were impossible given the amount of feedback they had received.  To gain a given seller 
rank, one criterion was that the seller must have made a certain minimum number of sales. We were 
able to find examples where the seller had fewer feedbacks than the sales threshold for a given rank, 
yet was still placed in this rank.  For these sellers, their ‘experience level’ – which the site’s wiki 
defined as "the total number of sales that an individual vendor has made” – was higher than the 
number of feedbacks and qualified them for the higher seller rank. 
30 In particular, see Soska and Christin (2015), section 4.1, which says that ‘In many marketplaces (e.g., Silk Road, Silk 
Road 2.0, Agora, Evolution among others) customers are required to leave feedback for a vendor whenever they receive 
their order of one of the vendor’s items.’ 
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Figure A1: Screenshots 
Silk Road 2.0 
Agora 
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Figure A1: Screenshots (Continued) 
Evolution 
Nucleus 
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